Image alt tag

Error!

X

There was a problem contacting the server. Please try after sometime.

Sorry, we are unable to process your request.

Error!

X

We're sorry, but the Insights and Intelligence Tool is temporarily unavailable

If this problem persists, or if you need immediate assistance, please contact Customer Service at 1-888-522-2388.

Error!

X

We're sorry, but the Literature Center checkout function is temporarily unavailable.

If this problem persists, or if you need immediate assistance, please contact Customer Service at 1-888-522-2388.

Tracked Funds

You have 0 funds on your mutual fund watch list.

Begin by selecting funds to create a personalized watch list.

(as of 12/05/2015)

Pending Orders

You have 0 items in your cart.

Subscribe and order forms, fact sheets, presentations, and other documents that can help advisers grow their business.

A verification Email Has Been Sent

Close

An email verification email has been sent to .
Follow the instructions to complete the email validation process.

I have not received my verification email

Check your SPAM mailbox and make sure that twelcome@lordabbett.com is allowed to send you mail.

I'm still having trouble

If you're still having trouble verifying your email address. feel free to contact us.

1-888-522-2388
clientservices@lordabbett.com


OK

We're sorry. We found no record of the email address you provided.

Close

Register For a LordAbbett.com Account
Using Your Email Address.

  • Registered Financial Advisors gain access to:
  • Our data mining tool, Insight & Intelligence
  • Best in-class practice management content
  • Educational events, videos and podcasts.
  • The Lord Abbett Review - Subscribe now!

Registered but Having Problems?

If you believe you are registered and are having problems verifying your email address, feel free to contact us.

1-888-522-2388 clientservices@lordabbett.com

Terms & Condition

X

These Terms of Use ("Terms of Use") are made between the undersigned user ("you") and Lord, Abbett & Co. ("we" or "us"). They become effective on the date that you electronically execute these Terms of Use ("Effective Date").

A. You are a successful financial consultant that markets securities, including the Lord Abbett Family of Funds;

B. We have developed the Lord Abbett Intelligence System (the "Intelligence System"), a state of the art information resource that we make available to a limited community of broker/dealers through the Internet at a secure Web site (the "LAIS Site"); and

C. We wish to provide access to the Intelligence System to you as an information tool responsive to the demands of your successful business pursuant to these Terms of Use. Accordingly, you and we, intending to be legally bound, hereby agree as follows:]

1. Overview. · Scope. These Terms of Use (which we may amend from time to time) govern your use of the Intelligence System. · Revisions; Changes. We may amend these Terms of Use at any time by posting amended Terms of Use ("Amended Terms of Use") on the LAIS Site. Any Amended Terms of Use will become effective immediately upon posting. Your use of the Intelligence System after any Amended Terms of Use become effective will be deemed to constitute your acceptance of those Amended Terms of Use.We may modify or discontinue the Intelligence System at any time, temporarily or permanently, with or without notice to you. Purpose of the Intelligence System. The Intelligence System is intended to be an information resource that you may use to contribute to your business research. The Intelligence System is for broker/dealer use only; it is not to be used with the public in oral, written or electronic form. The information on the Intelligence System and LAIS Site is for your information only and is neither the tax, legal or investment advice of Lord Abbett or its third-party sources nor their recommendation to purchase or sell any security.

2. Your Privileges. · Personal Use. Your use of the Intelligence System is a nontransferable privilege granted by us to you and that we may deny, suspend or revoke at any time, with or without cause or notice. · Access to and Use of the Intelligence System. The User ID and password (together, an "Access ID") issued by us to you (as subsequently changed by you from time to time) is for your exclusive access to and use of the Intelligence System. You will: (a) be responsible for the security and use of your Access ID, (b) not disclose your Access ID to anyone and (c) not permit anyone to use your Access ID. Any access or use of the Intelligence System through the use of your Access ID will be deemed to be your actions, for which you will be responsible. · Required Technology. You must provide, at your own cost and expense, the equipment and services necessary to access and use the Intelligence System. At any time, we may change the supporting technology and services necessary to use the Intelligence System. · Availability. We make no guarantee that you will be able to access the Intelligence System at any given time or that your access will be uninterrupted, error-free or free from unauthorized security breaches.

3. Rights in Data. Our use of information collected from you will be in accordance with our Privacy Policy posted on the LAIS Site. Our compliance with our Privacy Policy will survive any termination of these Terms of Use or of your use of the Intelligence System.

4. Your Conduct in the Use of the Intelligence System. You may access, search, view and store a personal copy of the information contained on the LAIS Site for your use as a broker/dealer. Any other use by you of the Intelligence System and the information contained on the LAIS Site these Terms of Use is strictly prohibited. Without limiting the preceding sentence, you will not: · Engage in or permit any reproduction, copying, translation, modification, adaptation, creation of derivative works from, distribution, transmission, transfer, republication, compilation or decompilation, reverse engineering, display, removal or deletion of the Intelligence System, any portion thereof, or any data, content or information provided by us or any of our third-party sources in any form, media or technology now existing or hereafter developed, that is not specifically authorized under these Terms of Use.

· Remove, obscure or alter any notice, disclaimer or other disclosure affixed to or contained within the Intelligence System, including any copyright notice, trademark and other proprietary rights notices and any legal notices regarding the data, content or information provided through the Intelligence System.

· Create a hyperlink to, frame or use framing techniques to enclose any information found anywhere on the LAIS Site without our express prior written consent.

· Impersonate any person, or falsely state or otherwise misrepresent his or her affiliation with any person in connection with any use of the Intelligence System.

· Breach or attempt to breach the security of the Intelligence System or any network, servers, data, or computers or other hardware relating to or used in connection with the Intelligence System; nor (b) use or distribute through the Intelligence System software or other tools or devices designed to interfere with or compromise the privacy, security or use of the Intelligence System by others or the operations or assets of any person.

· Violate any applicable law, including, without limitation, any state federal securities laws. 5. Your Representations and Warranties. You hereby represent and warrant to us, for our benefit, as of the time of these Terms of Use and for so long as you continue to use the Intelligence System, that (a) you are, and will continue to be, in compliance with these Terms of Use and any applicable laws and (b) you are authorized to provide to us the information we collect, as described in our Privacy Policy.

6. Disclaimer of Warranties.

· General Disclaimers.

THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, THE LAIS SITE AND ALL DATA, INFORMATION AND CONTENT ON THE LAIS SITE ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND “AS AVAILABLE” AND WITHOUT ANY REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND. WITHOUT LIMITING THE PRECEDING SENTENCE, LORD ABBETT, ITS AFFILIATES, AGENTS, THIRD-PARTY SUPPLIERS AND LICENSORS, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE EMPLOYEES, CONTRACTORS, DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND SHAREHOLDERS (COLLECTIVELY, THE “LORD ABBETT GROUP”) EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE, AND NONINFRINGEMENT. YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT YOUR USE OF THE LAIS SITE, THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, AND THE DATA, INFORMATION AND CONTENT PRESENTED THERE ARE AT YOUR SOLE RISK AND THAT THE LORD ABBETT GROUP WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY (A) ERRORS OR INACCURACIES IN THE DATA, CONTENT AND INFORMATION ON THE LAIS SITE AND THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OR (B) ANY TERMINATION, SUSPENSION, INTERRUPTION OF SERVICES, OR DELAYS IN THE OPERATION OF THE LAIS SITE OR THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

· Disclaimer Regarding Investment Research.

THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM INCORPORATES DATA, CONTENT AND INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS SOURCES THAT WE BELIEVE TO BE ACCURATE AND RELIABLE. HOWEVER, THE LORD ABBETT GROUP MAKES NO CLAIMS, REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS OR TRUTHFULNESS OF SUCH DATA, CONTENT AND INFORMATION. YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR INDEPENDENTLY VERIFYING YOUR INVESTMENT RESEARCH PRIOR TO FORMING YOUR INVESTMENT DECISIONS OR RENDERING INVESTMENT ADVICE. THE LORD ABBETT GROUP WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY INVESTMENT DECISION MADE BY YOU OR ANY OTHER PERSON BASED UPON THE DATA, CONTENT AND INFORMATION PROVIDED THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OR ON THE LAIS SITE.

· Survival.

THIS SECTION 6 SHALL SURVIVE ANY TERMINATION OF THESE TERMS OF USE OR YOUR USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM..

7. Limitations on Liability.

NONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE LORD ABBETT GROUP WILL BE LIABLE TO YOU OR ANY OTHER PERSON FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES (INCLUDING LOSS OF PROFITS, LOSS OF USE, TRANSACTION LOSSES, OPPORTUNITY COSTS, LOSS OF DATA, OR INTERRUPTION OF BUSINESS) RESULTING FROM, ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, THE LAIS SITE OR YOUR USE THEREOF, EVEN IF THE LORD ABBETT GROUP HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. THIS SECTION 7 WILL SURVIVE ANY TERMINATION OF THESE TERMS OF USE OR YOUR USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

8. Miscellaneous Provisions.

· Governing Law. This Agreement will governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to applicable conflicts of law principles.

THE UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT OR ANY VERSION THEREOF, ADOPTED BY ANY STATE, IN ANY FORM ("UCITA") WILL NOT APPLY TO THESE TERMS OF USE. TO THE EXTENT THAT UCITA IS APPLICABLE, THE PARTIES HEREBY AGREE TO OPT OUT OF THE APPLICABILITY OF UCITA PURSUANT TO THE OPT-OUT PROVISION(S) CONTAINED THEREIN.

The Intelligence System is not intended to be used by consumers, nor are the consumer protection laws of any jurisdiction intended to apply to the Intelligence System. You agree to initiate and maintain any action, suit or proceeding relating to these Terms of Use or arising out of the use of the Intelligence System exclusively in the courts, state and federal, located in or having jurisdiction over New York County, New York.

YOU HEREBY CONSENT TO THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF THE COURTS, STATE AND FEDERAL, LOCATED IN OR HAVING JURISDICTION OVER NEW YORK COUNTY, NEW YORK. YOU AGREE THAT YOU WILL NOT OBJECT TO A PROCEEDING BROUGHT IN YOUR LOCAL JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE AN ORDER OR JUDGMENT OBTAINED IN NEW YORK.

· Relationship of Parties. The parties to these Terms of Use are independent contractors and nothing in these Terms of Use will be construed as creating an employment relationship, joint venture, partnership, agency or fiduciary relationship between the parties.

· Notice. All notices provided under these Terms of Use will be in writing and will be deemed effective: (a) when delivered personally, (b) when received by electronic delivery, (c) one business day after deposit with a commercial overnight carrier specifying next day delivery, with written verification of receipt, or (d) three business days after having been sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. We will only accept notices from you in English and by conventional mail addressed to: General Counsel Lord, Abbett & Co. 90 Hudson Street Jersey City, N.J. 07302-3973 We may give you notice by conventional mail or electronic mail addressed to the last mail or electronic mail address transmitted by you to us.

· Third-Party Beneficiaries. The members of the Lord Abbett Group are third-party beneficiaries of the rights and benefits provided to us under these Terms of Use. You understand and agree that any right or benefit available to us or any member of the Lord Abbett Group hereunder will also be deemed to accrue to the benefit of, and may be exercised directly by, any member of the Lord Abbett Group to the extent applicable.

· Survival. This Section 8 will survive any termination of these Terms of Use or your use of the Intelligence System. The undersigned hereby signs these Terms of Use. By electronically signing and clicking "Accept" below, these Terms of Use will be legally binding on me. To sign these Terms of Use, confirm your full name and enter your User ID and Password (as your electronic signature) in the fields indicated below and click the “I Accept” button.

Reset Your Password

Financial Professionals*

Your password must be a minimum of characters.

Confirmation Message

Your LordAbbett.com password was successully updated. This page will be refreshed after 3 seconds.

OK

 

Economic Insights

Until the prime minister draws the "third arrow"—structural reform—from his quiver, Japan's economic and investment prospects will remain limited.

Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has politicked exquisitely. He has done public relations even better. Yet it is with economic policy that he has fallen short. His program, called “Abenomics,” has simply failed to lift Japan’s economy from shallows in which it has wallowed for more than 20 years now. That is hardly surprising. Despite all the fanfare, little that he has implemented is new, while he has neglected the one novel and promising aspect of his agenda, structural reform. Until he (or someone else) takes this fundamental aspect of policy seriously enough to actually do something, Japan’s economic prospects will remain mediocre.

Abe’s Initial Splash
Since the time Abe first took office in 2013, he has touted his supposedly novel plan to revitalize the economy. His agenda consists of three initiatives—“arrows” he calls them. The first arrow is a massive government stimulus program, mostly on new infrastructure, amounting to as much as 3.5% of Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP). The second arrow consists of extremely easy monetary policies, including an increase in the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) inflation target, from 1.0 to 2.0%, and a large injection of liquidity into the system through a quantitative easing that would, the government claims, expand the central bank’s balance sheet by 1.0% of GDP in the first year. The third arrow would aim at structural reforms to make Japan’s economy more dynamic and growth oriented, including efforts to streamline energy, environmental, and healthcare regulation, and take steps to cope with the rising average age of the population and the resulting overhang of dependent retirees.1

At present, Abe has only let loose the first two arrows. For a while, these seemed to be sufficient. Japan’s financial markets responded well, as did its economy. The country’s real GDP expanded at an annual rate of 3.7% during the first three quarter of 2013—a major turnabout from the half-percent decline recorded in 2012. That rate fell modestly in fourth quarter 2013, but jumped again at an impressive 6.6% annualized rate in 2014’s first quarter. By that time, it appeared as though Abenomics was working, even with its third arrow still held in the prime minister’s quiver. But then the skein of good news began to unravel. The economy fell a hard 7.4% at an annualized rate in the spring quarter last year, and continued to decline at a less precipitous but still severe 2.0% annualized rate during the summer quarter. Preliminary data for the fourth quarter point to a rise, but only barely, at an annualized rate of 0.2%.2     

Why Things Have Fallen Apart
At base, the recovery faltered, because what Abe has done is essentially a reprise of past failed policies. Floods of infrastructure spending certainly are an old story for Japan. Tokyo has turned to this “solution” frequently throughout the country’s long period of stagnation, so much so, in fact, that the government now carries on outstanding debt burden in excess of 260% of the country’s GDP—by far the highest in the developed world. To be sure, all this past spending also has created a world-class infrastructure in Japan, rail, roads, and ports of all kinds, and that, no doubt, has contributed to the country’s still great wealth. But the world’s shiniest and newest infrastructure offers less return from additional spending than a less impressive structure would. It clearly has with Abe’s recent effort.3    

There is an ominous side to the infrastructure spending that also speaks to why it has had a limited effect. Prime Minister Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LPD), since it became the leading party of Japan in the mid-1950s, has notoriously rewarded its supporters, regions, and firms with infrastructure contracts. The current policy would seem only to extend that old and, incidentally, economically inefficient pattern. As if to underscore continuities with these less than optimal past practices, the LDP not too long ago promised to offset the ill effects of scheduled consumer tax increases by spending more on infrastructure—in other words, use tax moneys to reward its favorites in areas where there may be no real need.4

Abe’s second arrow, easy monetary policy, including quantitative easing, may avoid the corruptions of the past, but it, too, is hardly new. The BoJ resorted to it in the mid-1990s, when Japan tried to recover from its earlier real estate collapse. The policy failed again later in the 1990s, when the BoJ tried to use it to offset the effects of the general Asian financial collapse (referred to commonly as the Asian contagion). The program is reminiscent of still earlier BoJ policies that aimed to promote exports by using easy money to depress the foreign exchange value of the yen. This time, though the yen did decline in response to the bank’s policy, it did so in a very different economy than Japan once had. The country’s wealth, high average wage rate, and more recently huge overhang of dependent retirees have rendered it much more consumer driven and much less export driven than it once was. Today, exports constitute a mere 15% of the economy, less than half what they once were. Little wonder then that the old yen-depressing approach has had little lasting effect.5  

Abe’s Unused Third Arrow  
Meanwhile, Abe has done little or nothing about structural reform. Here, Japan has a great need and, consequently, a great potential response to effective policies. Its structural problems run wide and deep. A high wage structure makes it increasingly difficult to compete against the rest of emerging Asia, most particularly China, while an aging population, in which already one person in five is of retirement age, makes it impossible for the country to recapture its old position as the world’s workshop. To remedy such economic impediments, Japan needs to uncover new sources of labor and economic efficiency as well as reorient its economic focus away from broad-level exports, where it competes directly with China, toward higher-value products, where it has comparative advantages that can support its relatively high wage structure. Yet however much promise there is in policy initiatives to serve these critical needs, Abe has failed even to define his fundamental structural reforms, much less implement them.6

To be fair, Abe has taken two tentative steps. To supplement Japan’s shrinking workforce, he has pledged to increase childcare facilities to bring more women into the paid workforce. The potential here is huge. Japan has the lowest women’s labor participation rate in the developed world, less than 50%. But his effort so far is small indeed next to the actual need, so much so it looks more like a pilot program than a policy initiative. Abe has also has made arrangements to allow a few more foreign workers into Japan under very strict conditions. This, too, is only a minor adjustment in the face of pressing needs, though questions remain about the effectiveness of any immigration in Japan’s still xenophobic culture.7

While playing small ball in those instances where he has acted, Abe has otherwise ignored other critical aspects of the economy’s structural failings. One involves Japan’s notoriously inefficient distribution network. Instead of the large national warehouse, shipping, and retail outlets in evidence elsewhere in the developed world, it still has a vast numbers of small, largely family owned arrangements, many of which fall short of even regional scope. The approach protects much small business, which has its virtues, but it also is notably inefficient and expensive, and it uses more labor than otherwise, an especially unfortunate quality in a nation with a large overhang of retirees and a shrinking working-age population. Yet Abe’s supposedly reformist program has done nothing to alter the licensing and zoning practices that perpetuate this system, something it could otherwise easily do in Japan’s highly centralized system of government.8

The country also would benefit from reforms in its overarching industrial structure. It has an extremely top-down approach of economic organization. A close association of politicians, bureaucrats, and big business (referred to popularly as the “iron triangle”) has long set the economy’s priorities and direction. In the more distant past, when Japan trailed Western development, the approach worked well. The iron triangle could use trends in the United States to identify developmental directions and set the country’s economic agenda accordingly. But after Japan caught up to the West some 25 years ago, it has needed more innovation and new development of its own to meet the demands of a developed, high-wage economy. Those requirements are best met by new firms, experimenting with new technologies as well as novel business strategies. To be sure, even the iron triangle has managed innovations. Japan leads in robotics, for instance. But an economy of Japan’s size and scope needs more than a single line of development. Only newer firms can bring such a broad-based effort, and the big business leg of the triangle naturally has resisted. Yet, Abe’s supposedly reformist team has not even considered policies that might improve this situation.9

Prospects 
If Abe were to release his third arrow and actually begin these and other structural reforms, Japan’s economic prospects almost surely would pick up, greatly and durably. Its investment climate would become that much more attractive in tandem with such an improvement. While, however, Abe continues to rely on the backward-looking and less and less effective policies that constitute his first two arrows, those economic and investment prospects will remain limited, as they have for more than 20 years now.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lord Abbett's Blog

videoOur new blog features timely commentary and analysis from Lord Abbett experts. Join the conversation.

RELATED CONTENT

Please confirm your literature shipping address

Please review the address information below and make any necessary changes.

All literature orders will be shipped to the address that you enter below. This information can be edited at any time.

Current Literature Shipping Address

* Required field