Using Our Voice

Lord Abbett is guided by the higher purpose expressed in our shared mission: Securing a sustainable future for our clients, our people, and our world. For the clients we proudly serve, this means we invest to support their values, make an impact, and provide financial security. With this higher purpose as our north star and our fiduciary responsibilities foremost in mind, we are committed to using our voice as investors.

Our investment approach is rooted in fundamental research, which views environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors as a major input that has taken on greater importance, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. We are fully committed to holding ourselves—and the companies in which we invest—accountable. Moreover, as investors, we have found that our voice carries weight, and we intend to lean in and engage with companies on the crucial issues of sustainability. One significant way for us to use our voice is through proxy voting, which is a key lever in influencing and signaling our position to companies on ESG and other key issues.

In March 2020, we established Lord Abbett’s Investment Stewardship Council, whose members actively engage with our research analysts and portfolio managers to fully integrate ESG factors into our investment decision-making process. To ensure that our approach to proxy voting is thoughtful and consistent, all decisions are informed by the collaborate efforts between our Stewardship team, the relevant Investment teams, and the Investment Stewardship Council.

The proxy voting procedures that follow represent our deep commitment to using the power of our voice as active investors in our continued efforts to secure a sustainable future for the benefit of all stakeholders.

Sincerely,

Douglas. B. Sieg
Managing Partner
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Introduction

Intent

Proxy Voting at Lord Abbett is guided by our mission: **Securing a sustainable future for our clients, our people, and our world.** This mission is the cornerstone of our global corporate citizenship and investment efforts, including our approach to proxy voting. Lord Abbett is committed to driving positive change as a firm through our global corporate citizenship initiatives, and as investors, through our engagement and proxy voting practices. The intent of this policy is to communicate our expectations on key proxy topics and provide an overview of how Lord Abbett evaluates proxy voting issues in alignment with our mission.

Active Ownership

Active ownership is the process whereby Lord Abbett engages directly with an investee company’s management to understand, influence, or exchange perspectives on issues, including proxy voting issues. Active ownership is an integral part of identifying companies with strong corporate governance and avoiding the adverse effects associated with poor environmental and social practices. Engagement with issuers informs Lord Abbett’s proxy voting decision-making and can drive positive changes to influence long-term sustainable performance.

Looking Ahead

We remain committed to using our voice as investors. Moving forward, consideration of ESG factors will continue to play a growing role in our investment analysis across all of our investment strategies and portfolios. We will also continue to use proxy voting as a key lever in communicating our position to companies on ESG and other issues. As we advance on our journey, we expect our approach to evolve over time—always guided by our higher purpose.
Proxy Voting Policies

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)

Proposals related to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues are typically initiated by shareholders and urge a company to disclose certain information or change certain business practices.

Lord Abbett believes ESG factors may impact long-term financial performance and can represent significant risks and costs to a business. We believe that well-developed policies and disclosures can help identify and mitigate risks and costs associated with ESG issues. We encourage companies to be transparent about ESG issues and adopt policies and processes to assist in managing risks and opportunities associated with these factors. Lord Abbett generally favors the disclosure of material data and metrics related to the risks and opportunities associated with ESG factors, including detailed disclosure of internal ESG policies. We believe companies that are best positioned to manage the risks and opportunities associated with ESG factors will increase their potential to deliver superior long-term shareholder value.

Lord Abbett evaluates all proxy proposals based on their potential effect on shareholder value. Lord Abbett will vote for proposals related to ESG factors that we believe ask for useful disclosure or positive changes to business practices. We will vote against proposals we believe are unduly burdensome or impose substantial costs on a company with no countervailing economic benefits.
to the company’s shareholders. We evaluate proposals involving ESG matters on a case-by-case basis, understanding that ESG risks and opportunities can vary greatly by industry and company. As a result, Lord Abbett may vote similar proposals differently based on the particular facts and circumstances.

Lord Abbett routinely utilizes issuer engagement to inform proxy voting decisions on ESG proposals and will pay particular attention to highly controversial issues, as well as instances where management has failed repeatedly to take corrective actions with respect to an issue.

Diversity

Lord Abbett believes that diversity is a vital component in the long-term, sustainable success of companies. We believe that organizations with inclusive environments that embrace a diversity of thought, background, and experience are more successful in attracting and retaining talent, as well as more agile, more impactful, and better-prepared for the future. Given the importance of diversity, Lord Abbett expects and encourages companies to have clear equal employment opportunity or diversity policies to facilitate diversity within an organization. Lord Abbett also encourages the disclosure of workforce diversity metrics consistent with data provided on EEO-1 reports or other comparable data.

Lord Abbett generally supports proposals requesting additional disclosure of diversity initiatives or workforce diversity metrics. In evaluating diversity-related proposals, Lord Abbett will consider current company disclosures, peer disclosures, diversity-related controversies, and a company’s overall approach to ESG, among other factors.

Climate

Lord Abbett believes that climate change represents long-term risks to both the physical world and individual companies’ long-term performance. Lord Abbett incorporates risks associated with climate change into our investment process and encourages companies to publicly disclose material data related to climate change. We believe that companies should clearly address how their businesses may be impacted by climate change and disclose steps they are taking to mitigate climate risks associated with their business activities. Further, we encourage the disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adoption of GHG reduction targets in carbon-intensive industries.

Lord Abbett generally supports proposals that request that a company disclose GHG emissions or report on plans to reduce a company’s total contribution to climate change. In evaluating climate-related proposals, Lord Abbett will consider current company disclosures, a company’s overall contributions to climate change, GHG reduction goals, peer disclosures, and other climate-related commitments and disclosures, among other factors.

Political Contributions and Lobbying

Lord Abbett recognizes that companies may engage in the political process within legal limits to help shape public policy consistent with a company’s strategy. While Lord Abbett understands the rationale for involvement in certain political activities, we encourage transparency in the process; specifically, Lord Abbett encourages the disclosure of oversight mechanisms related to political contributions and lobbying processes, including board oversight.

Lord Abbett will vote proposals related to political contributions and lobbying on a case-by-case basis. In evaluating these proposals, Lord Abbett will consider the current level of disclosure, previous litigation or controversies, peer disclosure, and reputational or legal risks, among other factors.
Board of Directors

The board of directors of a company oversees all aspects of the company’s business. Companies and, under certain circumstances, their shareholders, may nominate directors for election by shareholders. In evaluating the candidacy of a director nominee to the board of a company, Lord Abbett will consider the following factors, among others: (1) the nominee’s experience, qualifications, attributes, and skills, as disclosed in the company’s proxy statement; (2) the composition of the board and its committees, including overall board diversity; (3) whether the nominee is independent of the company’s management; (4) the nominee’s board meeting attendance; (5) the nominee’s history of representing shareholder interests on the company’s board or other boards; (6) the total number of outside board positions held by a nominee; (7) the nominee’s investment in the company; (8) the company’s long-term performance relative to a market index; and (9) takeover activity. In evaluating an audit, nominating, governance, or compensation committee nominee’s candidacy, Lord Abbett will consider additional factors related to the specific committee’s oversight responsibilities. Lord Abbett may withhold votes for some or all of a company’s director nominees on a case-by-case basis.

Board Diversity

Lord Abbett believes that diverse and inclusive companies are better positioned for long-term, sustainable success. We believe it is important that a company’s tone on diversity and inclusion be set at the top, including maintaining a diverse board of directors. Diversity is multidimensional, and we encourage the consideration of a wide range of diverse characteristics within board composition, including: age, disabilities, education, ethnicity, gender, military service, race, religion, sexual orientation and skills, among other factors.

Lord Abbett will consider voting against the nominating committee or other relevant directors if there are no women on the board and no plan has been articulated to diversify board membership. Lord Abbett will consider our engagement history with a company and vote on a case-by-case basis if we have engaged with the company and they have articulated a plan for facilitating diversity on the board.

Lord Abbett believes strongly in the value of transparency and believes that reliable and consistent information is necessary to make informed investment decisions. To that end, Lord Abbett encourages the reporting of board diversity statistics, including racial and ethnic diversity, in a clear, consistent manner.

Overboarding

Lord Abbett believes that director nominees should be able to dedicate sufficient time to each of the companies they represent in order to fully execute their board oversight responsibilities. We believe it is important that directors not be “overboarded” to avoid excessive time-commitments and provide consistent contributions to all boards on which they serve. Lord Abbett may vote against...
that we feel are “overboarded”, and will consider voting against director nominees if they sit on more than five public company boards, or if they are an active CEO that sits on more than two outside public company boards.

**Governance Structure**

Lord Abbett may consider a vote against certain director nominees at companies that have material governance shortcomings, including those implemented at the time of IPO, with no articulated plan to sunset certain provisions. Governance shortcomings may include dual-class voting structures, classified boards, or supermajority vote standards, among others.

**Environmental and Social Factors**

Lord Abbett may consider a vote against certain director nominees at companies that have material ESG shortcomings, such as unmitigated climate risks that the company and its board have failed to address.

**Majority Voting**

Lord Abbett generally favors a majority voting standard, under which director nominees are elected by an affirmative majority of the votes cast. We will generally support proposals that seek to adopt a majority voting standard.

**Board Classification**

Lord Abbett generally believes that directors should be elected annually, and we will typically support proposals that seek to remove a classified board structure. When evaluating board classification proposals, Lord Abbett may consider the following factors, among others: (1) the company’s long-term strategic plan; (2) the extent to which continuity of leadership is necessary to advance that plan; and (3) the need to guard against takeover attempts.

**Board Independence**

Lord Abbett believes that independent board oversight is key to the long-term sustainable success of a company and believes that a majority of board members should be independent from the company. An independent director is one who serves on a company’s board but is not employed by the company or affiliated with it in any other capacity. While company boards may apply different standards in assessing director independence, including any applicable standards prescribed by stock exchanges and the federal securities laws, a director generally is determined to qualify as independent if the director does not have any material relationship with the company (either directly or indirectly) based on all relevant facts and circumstances. Material relationships can include employment, business, and familial relationships, among others. Lord Abbett may vote against non-independent board nominees if their election would cause a majority of board members to be non-independent.

**Independent Board Chair**

Proponents of proposals to require independent board chair seek to enhance board accountability and mitigate a company’s risk-taking behavior by requiring that the role of the chair of the company’s board of directors be filled by an independent director. Lord Abbett votes on a case-by-case basis on proposals that call for an independent board chair, and will consider a variety of factors, including if we believe that a company’s governance structure promotes independent oversight through other means, such as a lead director, a board composed of a majority of independent directors, or independent board committees. In evaluating independent chair proposals, we will focus in particular on the presence of a lead director, who is an independent director designated by a board with a non-independent chair to serve as the primary liaison between company management and the independent directors and act as the independent directors’ spokesperson.
Compensation and Benefits

Lord Abbett pays particular attention to the nature and amount of compensation paid by a company to its executive officers and other employees. Lord Abbett believes that because a company has exclusive knowledge of material information not available to shareholders regarding its business, financial condition, and prospects, the company itself usually is in the best position to make decisions about compensation and benefits. However, we believe that companies should provide detailed disclosure of their compensation practices to allow investors to properly analyze the effectiveness and appropriateness of the company’s compensation structure.

Lord Abbett reviews all issues related to compensation on a case-by-case basis, and may oppose management if: (1) we deem a company’s compensation to be excessive or inconsistent with its peer companies’ compensation; (2) we believe a company’s compensation measures do not foster a long-term focus among its executive officers and other employees; or (3) we believe a company has not met performance expectations, among other reasons.
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

“Say-on-pay” proposals give shareholders a nonbinding vote on executive compensation and serve as a means of conveying to company management shareholder concerns, if any, about executive compensation. Lord Abbett will evaluate say-on-pay proposals on a case-by-case basis and will consider a variety of factors in evaluating compensation, including if we believe that compensation has been excessive or not properly aligned with long-term performance. Lord Abbett places a high value on engagement with companies, and we will consider if direct feedback to management about compensation has resulted in any changes when voting on compensation proposals. Lord Abbett generally prefers that say-on-pay proposals occur on an annual basis.

Equity Compensation Plans

Equity compensation plans are intended to reward an executive’s performance through various stock-based incentives and should be designed to align an executive’s compensation with a company’s long-term performance. Lord Abbett will vote on equity compensation plans on a case-by-case basis, and in evaluating such proposals we will consider the following factors, among others: (1) whether or to what extent the plan has any potential to dilute the voting power or economic interests of other shareholders; (2) the rate at which a company grants equity awards; (3) the features of the plan and costs associated with it; (4) whether the plan allows for repricing or replacement of underwater stock options; and (5) quantitative data regarding compensation ranges by industry and company size. We carefully scrutinize any proposed repricing or replacement of underwater stock options, taking into consideration the stock’s volatility, management’s rationale for the repricing or replacement, the new exercise price, and any other factors we deem relevant.

Clawback Provisions

Lord Abbett believes that clawback provisions generally encourage executive accountability and help mitigate a company’s risk-taking behavior. Lord Abbett will evaluate proposals to require clawback provisions on a case-by-case basis and will consider a variety of factors, including concerns about the amount of compensation paid to the executive, the executive’s or the company’s performance, or accounting irregularities, among other factors we may deem relevant.

Tax Gross-ups

Lord Abbett generally favors adoption of anti-tax gross-up policies, which limit payments by a company to an executive intended to reimburse some or all of the executive’s tax liability with respect to compensation, perquisites, and other benefits.

Severance Agreements

Severance or so-called “golden parachute” payments are sometimes made to departing executives after termination or upon a company’s change in control. Lord Abbett will consider severance arrangements in the overall evaluation of executive compensation and may scrutinize cases in which benefits are especially lucrative, granted despite the executive’s or the company’s poor performance, or materially amended shortly before a triggering event.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans

Employee stock purchase plans permit employees to purchase company stock at discounted prices and, under certain circumstances, receive favorable tax treatment when they sell the stock. Lord Abbett will vote on a case-by-case basis on employee stock purchase plans and will consider overall incentive structure and any dilutive effects of such plans, among other factors.
Shareholder Rights

Proxy access

Proxy access proposals advocate permitting shareholders to have their nominees for election to a company’s board of directors included in the company’s proxy statement in opposition to the company’s own nominees. Proxy access initiatives enable shareholders to nominate their own directors without incurring the often substantial cost of preparing and mailing a proxy statement, making it less expensive and easier for shareholders to challenge incumbent directors. Lord Abbett votes on a case-by-case basis and will evaluate proposals that seek to allow proxy access based on the merits of each situation. Similarly, Lord Abbett evaluates proposals that seek to amend the terms of an already existing proxy access by-law (“proxy fix-it” proposals) on a case-by-case basis, but may vote against these proposals if the existing proxy access by-law has reasonable provisions already in place.

Shareholder Rights Plans

Shareholder rights plans or “poison pills” are a mechanism of defending a company against takeover efforts. Poison pills allow current shareholders to purchase stock at discounted prices or redeem shares at a premium after a takeover, effectively making the company more expensive and less attractive to potential acquirers. Lord Abbett believes that poison pills can serve to entrench management and discourage takeover offers that may be attractive to shareholders; therefore, we generally vote in favor of proposals to eliminate poison pills and proposals to require that companies submit poison pills for shareholder ratification. In evaluating a poison pill proposal, however, Lord Abbett may consider the following factors, among others: (1) the duration of the poison pill; (2) whether we believe the poison pill facilitates a legitimate business strategy that is likely to enhance shareholder value; (3) our level of confidence in management; (4) whether we believe the poison pill will be used to force potential acquirers to negotiate with management and assure a degree of stability that will support good long-range corporate goals; and (5) the need to guard against takeover attempts.
Rights to Call Special Shareholder Meetings

Lord Abbett typically supports the right to call special shareholder meetings and in evaluating such a proposal, will consider the following factors, among others: (1) the stock ownership threshold required to call a special meeting; (2) the purposes for which shareholders may call a special meeting; (3) whether the company’s annual meetings offer an adequate forum in which shareholders may raise their concerns; and (4) the anticipated economic impact on the company of having to hold additional shareholder meetings. Similarly, Lord Abbett evaluates proposals that seek to amend the terms of an already existing special meeting right on a case-by-case basis but may vote against these proposals if the existing provision has a reasonable threshold in place.

Rights to Act by Written Consent

Lord Abbett votes on a case-by-case basis on proposals requesting rights to act by written consent, though may vote against these proposals if the company already grants shareholders the right to call special shareholder meetings at a reasonable threshold.

Supermajority Vote Requirements

A proposal that is subject to a supermajority vote must receive the support of more than a simple majority in order to pass. Supermajority vote requirements can have the effect of entrenching management by making it more difficult to effect change regarding a company and its corporate governance practices. Lord Abbett typically supports shareholders’ ability to approve or reject proposals based on a simple majority vote and will generally vote for proposals to remove supermajority vote requirements and against proposals to add them.

Cumulative Voting

Under cumulative or proportional voting, each shareholder is allotted a number of votes equal to the number of shares owned multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. This voting regime strengthens the voting power of minority shareholders because it enables shareholders to cast multiple votes for a single nominee. Lord Abbett believes that a shareholder or group of shareholders using this technique to elect a director may seek to have the director represent a narrow special interest rather than the interests of the broader shareholder population. Accordingly, we generally vote against cumulative voting proposals.

Confidential Voting

Lord Abbett believes that confidential voting allows shareholders to vote without fear of retribution or coercion based on their views. Thus, we generally support proposals that seek to preserve shareholders’ anonymity.

Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses

Lord Abbett votes on a case-by-case basis on shareholder proposals to require a company to reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by one or more shareholders in a successful proxy contest.

Transacting other business

Lord Abbett believes that proposals to allow shareholders to transact other business at a meeting may deprive other shareholders of sufficient time and information needed to carefully evaluate the relevant business issues and determine how to vote with respect to them. Therefore, Lord Abbett typically votes against such proposals.
Corporate Matters

Charter Amendments

A company’s charter documents, which may consist of articles of incorporation or a declaration of trust and bylaws, govern the company’s organizational matters and affairs. Lord Abbett considers proposals related to charter amendments on a case-by-case basis to the extent they are not explicitly covered by these guidelines.

Capital Structure

A company may propose amendments to its charter documents to change the number of authorized shares or create new classes of stock. Lord Abbett will generally support proposals to increase a company’s number of authorized shares if the company has articulated a clear and reasonable purpose for the increase (for example, to facilitate a stock split, merger, acquisition, or restructuring). However, we generally oppose share capital increases that would have a substantial dilutive effect.

Lord Abbett generally believes that all shares should have equal voting rights at publicly traded companies. Lord Abbett will generally oppose proposals to create a new class of stock with superior voting rights, and will typically vote for proposals to eliminate a dual or multi-class voting structure.

Reincorporation

We generally follow management’s recommendation regarding proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation, although we consider the rationale for the reincorporation and the financial, legal, and corporate governance implications of the reincorporation. We will vote against reincorporation proposals that we believe contravene shareholders’ interests.

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Restructurings

Lord Abbett views the decision to approve or reject a potential merger, acquisition, or restructuring as being equivalent to an investment decision. In evaluating such a proposal, Lord Abbett may consider the following factors, among others: (1) the anticipated financial and operating benefits; (2) the offer price; (3) the prospects of the resulting company; and (4) any expected changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.
Auditors

Auditors are responsible for examining, correcting, and verifying the accuracy of a company’s financial statements. Lord Abbett believes that companies normally are in the best position to select their auditors. However, we will evaluate such proposals on a case-by-case basis and may consider any concerns about impaired independence, accounting irregularities, or failure of the auditors to act in shareholders’ best economic interests, among other factors we may deem relevant.
Proxy Voting Process

Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, Lord Abbett acts as a fiduciary that owes each of its clients’ duties of care and loyalty with respect to all services undertaken on the client’s behalf, including proxy voting. This means that Lord Abbett is required to vote proxies in the manner we believe is in the best interests of each client, including the Lord Abbett Funds (the “Funds”) and their shareholders. We take a long-term perspective in investing our clients’ assets and employ the same perspective in voting proxies on their behalf. Accordingly, we tend to support proxy proposals that we believe are likely to maximize shareholder value over time, whether such proposals were initiated by a company or its shareholders.
Overview

The Investment Stewardship Council ("ISC") has governance over all forms of engagement, including proxy voting. The ISC consists of representatives from Investments, Client Services, and Corporate Services (Legal). One or more members of the ISC, hereinafter referred to as the "Proxy Group", are appointed to oversee proxy voting mechanics on a day-to-day basis under the governance of the ISC as a whole. Proxy decisions are typically made by the Proxy Group in accordance with the policies and procedures described in this document and in consultation with the ISC and members of the Investment team. In select cases, proxy decisions are referred to the ISC as a whole for resolution.

Lord Abbett has implemented the following approach to the proxy voting process:

- In cases where we deem any client’s position in a company to be material, the relevant investment team, in consultation with the ISC, is responsible for recommending how to vote the security. Once a voting decision has been made, the Proxy Group is responsible for submitting Lord Abbett’s vote.
- In cases where we deem all clients’ positions in a company to be non-material, the Proxy Group is responsible for recommending how to vote the security and will seek guidance from the ISC, the relevant investment team, Legal or other resources.
- When multiple investment teams manage one or more portfolios that hold the same voting security, the investment team that manages the largest number of shares of the security will be considered to have the dominant position. The investment team with the dominant position, in consultation with the ISC, will be responsible for determining a vote recommendation. Lord Abbett will vote all shares on behalf of all clients in accordance with that vote recommendation.

These guidelines provide a general summary of Lord Abbett’s views on specific proxy voting items. We reserve the flexibility to vote in a manner contrary to our general views on particular issues if we believe doing so is in the best interests of our clients, including the Funds and their shareholders. Many different specific types of proposals may arise under the broad categories discussed in this document, and it is not possible to contemplate every issue on which we may be asked to vote. Accordingly, we will vote on proposals concerning issues not expressly covered by these guidelines based on the specific factors that we believe are relevant. For institutional accounts managed on behalf of multi-employer pension or benefit plans, commonly referred to as "Taft-Hartley plans," Lord Abbett generally will vote proxies in accordance with the Proxy Voting Guidelines issued by the AFL-CIO, rather than the guidelines described above, unless instructed otherwise by the client.

Retention and Oversight of Proxy Service Provider

Lord Abbett has retained an independent third party service provider (the “Proxy Service Provider”) to analyze proxy issues and recommend how to vote on those issues, and to provide assistance in the administration of the proxy process, including maintaining complete proxy voting records. While Lord Abbett takes into consideration the information and recommendations of the Proxy Service Provider, Lord Abbett votes all proxies based on its own proxy voting policies, including Lord Abbett’s conclusions regarding the best interests of the Funds, their shareholders, and other advisory clients, rather than basing decisions solely on the Proxy Service Provider’s recommendations.

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1 We presently consider a position in a particular company to be material if: (1) it represents more than 1% of any client’s portfolio holdings and all clients’ positions in the company together represent more than 1% of the company’s outstanding shares; or (2) all clients’ positions in the company together represent more than 5% of the company’s outstanding shares. For purposes of determining materiality, we exclude shares held by clients with respect to which Lord Abbett does not have authority to vote proxies. We also exclude shares with respect to which Lord Abbett’s vote is restricted or limited due to super-voting share structures (where one class of shares has super-voting rights that effectively disenfranchise other classes of shares), vote limitation policies, and other similar measures. This definition of materiality is subject to change at our discretion.

2 Lord Abbett currently retains Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. as the Proxy Service Provider.
Lord Abbett monitors the Proxy Service Provider’s capacity, competency, and conflicts of interest to ensure that Lord Abbett continues to vote proxies in the best interests of its clients. As part of its ongoing oversight of the Proxy Service Provider, Lord Abbett performs periodic due diligence on the Proxy Service Provider. The topics included in these due diligence reviews include conflicts of interest, methodologies for developing vote recommendations, and resources, among other things.

Conflicts of Interest

Lord Abbett is an independent, privately held firm with a singular focus on the management of money. Although Lord Abbett does not face the conflicts of interest inherent in being part of a larger financial institution, conflicts of interest nevertheless may arise in the proxy voting process. Such a conflict may exist, for example, when a client’s account holds shares of a company that also is a client of Lord Abbett. We have adopted safeguards designed to ensure that conflicts of interest are identified and resolved in our clients’ best interests rather than our own. These safeguards include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Lord Abbett has implemented special voting measures with respect to companies for which one of the Funds’ independent directors/trustees also serves on the board of directors or is a nominee for election to the board of directors. If a Fund owns stock in such a company, Lord Abbett will notify the Funds’ Proxy Committee3 (the “Proxy Committee”) and seek voting instructions from the Committee only in those situations where Lord Abbett proposes not to follow the Proxy Service Provider’s recommendations. In these instances, if applicable, the independent director/trustee will abstain from any discussions and voting by the Funds’ Proxy Committee regarding the company.

- Lord Abbett also has implemented special voting measures with respect to any company (including any subsidiary of a company or retirement plan sponsored by a company) that has a significant business relationship with Lord Abbett. For this purpose, a “significant business relationship” means: (1) a broker dealer firm that is responsible for one percent or more of the Funds’ total dollar amount of shares sold for the last 12 months; (2) a firm that is a sponsor firm with respect to Lord Abbett’s separately managed account business; (3) an institutional account client that has an investment management agreement with Lord Abbett; (4) an institutional investor that, to Lord Abbett’s knowledge, holds at least $5 million in shares of the Funds; and (5) a retirement plan client that, to Lord Abbett’s knowledge, has at least $5 million invested in the Funds.

If a Fund owns shares of a company with such a business relationship (“Conflict Shares”) and Lord Abbett seeks to vote contrary to the Proxy Service Provider’s recommendation, then Lord Abbett will notify the Funds’ Proxy Committee and seek voting instructions from the Committee members. Lord Abbett generally will vote conflict proposals pursuant to the instruction of a majority of Committee members, but will act on the instructions of less than a majority if less than a majority respond and all responding members approve Lord Abbett’s proposed votes on such proposals. In all other cases, Lord Abbett will vote the Funds’ Conflict Shares in accordance with the Proxy Service Provider’s recommendation. Lord Abbett periodically will report to the Funds’ Proxy Committee its record of voting the Funds’ Conflict Shares in accordance with Committee member instructions.

Absent explicit instructions from an institutional account client to resolve proxy voting conflicts in a different manner, Lord Abbett will vote each such client’s Conflict Shares in the manner it votes the Funds’ Conflict Shares.

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3 The Boards of Directors and Trustees of the Funds have delegated oversight of proxy voting to a Proxy Committee comprised solely of independent directors or trustees, as the case may be. The Proxy Committee is responsible for, among other things: (1) monitoring Lord Abbett’s actions in voting securities owned by the related Fund; (2) evaluating Lord Abbett’s policies in voting securities; and (3) meeting with Lord Abbett to review the policies in voting securities, the sources of information used in determining how to vote on particular matters, and the procedures used to determine the votes in any situation where there may be a conflict of interest.
• To serve the best interests of a client that holds a given voting security, Lord Abbett generally will vote proxies without regard to other clients’ investments in different classes or types of securities or instruments of the same issuer that are not entitled to vote. Accordingly, when the voting security in one account is from an issuer whose other, non-voting securities or instruments are held in a second account in a different strategy, Lord Abbett will vote without input from members of the Investment team acting on behalf of the second account. Members of the Investment team, ISC or Proxy Group may seek guidance from Lord Abbett’s Investment Conflicts Committee, a cross-functional team intended to address potential conflicts deriving from holdings in different parts of the Capital Structure, with respect to any potential conflict of interest arising out of the holdings of multiple clients.

Securities Lending

Lord Abbett Funds may occasionally participate in a securities lending program. In circumstances where shares are on loan, the voting rights of those shares are transferred to the borrower. Lord Abbett will generally attempt to recall all securities that are on loan prior to the meeting record date, so that we will be entitled to vote those shares. However, Lord Abbett may be unable to recall shares or may choose not to recall shares for a number of reasons, including if timely notice of a meeting is not given or if potential revenue generation is deemed to outweigh the benefits of voting at a specific meeting.

Shareholder Resolutions

Lord Abbett may consider sponsoring or co-sponsoring a shareholder resolution to address an issue of concern if engagement and proxy voting are deemed to be ineffective.

Share Blocking

Certain foreign countries impose share blocking restrictions that would prohibit Lord Abbett from trading a company’s stock during a specified period before the company’s shareholder meeting. Lord Abbett believes that in these situations, the benefit of maintaining liquidity during the share blocking period outweighs the benefit of exercising our right to vote. Therefore, it is Lord Abbett’s general policy to not vote securities in cases where share blocking restrictions apply.